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Abstract
Predictable annual lean seasons occur in many rural areas, including West
Timor in Indonesia. Staple farmers there who face seasonal savings and credit
constraints have difficulty converting harvest season output to lean season con-
sumption. We conduct a randomized evaluation of a seasonal food credit program
and a food storage program designed to alleviate seasonal frictions which result
from these constraints. By providing improved ways to transfer assets across sea-
sons, each program potentially functions as a subsidy on lean season consump-
tion. The programs increased non-food consumption and reported income, but
had precise zero effects on staple food consumption. Our results are consistent
with positive income effects through the expansion of budget sets, but suggest
that the average household could be close to staple food satiation.
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1 Introduction
The Food and Agricultural Organization estimates that 868 million people are mal-
nourished globally (FAO, 2013). Seasonal food shortages are evident in many rural
areas.1 Predictable annual hunger seasons can arise when incomes vary by season and
households face savings and credit constraints.2 However, seasonality is an understud-
ied aspect of food security and there is limited evidence on the impacts of programs
that alleviate seasonal savings and credit constraints.3
We conducted a randomized evaluation of two food programs–food storage and
food credit–that target savings and credit constraints related to seasonal food shortages
in West Timor. This island in East Indonesia has historically suffered from an annual
lean season known as musim paceklik. Many subsistence farmers rely on rain-fed agri-
culture, have difficulty borrowing against future harvests, use rudimentary food storage
technologies with low retention rates, and face seasonal price variation.
We build a stylized model to show how the above features limit households’ abil-
ity to convert harvest season agricultural output into lean season consumption. Ab-
sent seasonal credit and savings constraints, the harvest-to-lean season marginal rate
of transformation (MRT) of food would be equal to one. In contrast, farmers in West
Timor face what we call seasonal frictions–an MRT of less than one. Our food credit
and food storage programs can raise the MRT by introducing new ways for farmers to
transfer assets across seasons.
In 2008, we randomly assigned 96 villages to receive a food storage program, a
food credit program, or no program. The storage program offered households free
staple food storage equipment–weather-sealed drums and sacks–with high retention
rates. For credit, women’s microcredit groups were formed and offered loans of staples
(rice and maize) during the lean season, which were to be repaid in kind during the
following harvest. Repaid grain was stored in sealed facilities for disbursement in the
following lean season. The programs had the potential to raise the harvest-to-lean MRT
by either improving the food retention rate or allowing households to borrow against
future harvests relatively cheaply.
Intuitively, the lower a household’s harvest-to-lean MRT, the more food it must
1Seasonal food shortages have been documented in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and
Southeast Asia. See Khandker and Mahmud (2012) and Devereux, Sabates-Wheeler, and Longhurst
(2012) for an overview.
2There is a large literature on the challenges to consumption smoothing in the presence of credit or
savings constraints, notably Deaton (1991) and Townsend (1994). See Khandker and Mahmud (2012)
for a discussion focused on seasonality and Zeller et al. (1997) for an overview that relates food security
policies to the consumption smoothing literature.
3Seasonal food deprivation has been described as the “cycle of quiet starvation” and the “father of
famine” (Devereux, Vaitla, and Swan, 2008) and “one of the most persistent and intractable aspects of
global food insecurity” (Khandker and Mahmud, 2012). Yet, according to two surveys on this topic,
“[o]f all the dimensions of rural deprivation, the most neglected is seasonality” (Devereux, Vaitla, and
Swan, 2008), and, “[a] focus on seasonality is often missing” in social protection schemes (Khandker and
Mahmud, 2012). There is a small but growing literature on policies to mitigate seasonal food shortages.
We discuss this later in the introduction.
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forego in any harvest to provide for a unit of lean season consumption. Seasonal fric-
tions therefore imply a high opportunity cost of lean season consumption. The pro-
grams, by raising the MRT, effectively serve as lean season subsidies. As a result,
households’ inter-seasonal budget sets should expand, changing consumption patterns
through income and substitution effects.
To investigate the impacts of these seasonal food policies, we built a large scale
seasonal household panel that tracked 2,870 households during each harvest and lean
season over three years. We test for treatment effects using four categories of well-
being: consumption and income levels, seasonal differences in consumption and in-
come, indicators of food shortages, and self-reported health.
Strikingly, both programs had fairly precise zero effects on staple food consumption
in spite of our focus on raising the MRT of staple foods. However, we find sizeable
impacts along other consumption and income margins. For storage, monthly per capita
non-food consumption increased by 32.4%. For credit, monthly per capita reported
income increased by 54.3% with no detectable drops in consumption levels.4 Both
patterns are consistent with positive income effects through budget set expansions for
treated households.
Additionally, under credit, the seasonal gap in monthly non-food expenditure items
narrowed by 16%, but there were moderately negative health effects in the harvest
season.5 In Sections 3 and 4, we highlight differences between the credit and stor-
age treatments that could explain why storage has positive effects on consumption but
none on seasonal differences, while credit has effects on both. In particular, the credit
program contains features that are arguably better at protecting households against risk.
Our paper relates to the literature on food policy in developing countries,6 and to the
literature on consumption seasonality.7 Angelucci and Attanasio (2013) and Attanasio,
Battistin, and Mesnard (2012) find positive effects of conditional transfers on food
consumption for poor urban households in Mexico and for urban and rural households
in Colombia. Hidrobo et al. (2014) find that food transfers, food vouchers and cash
transfers in urban centers in Ecuador significantly improved the quantity and quality
of food consumed. These programs are relatively less comparable to ours as the cash
4For credit, the effect on non-food consumption is 12% but is not statistically significant. For storage,
the effect on reported income is 51.5% but is not statistically significant.
5The health effects are statistically insignificant when we pool both seasons. For storage, we find
relatively precise zero effects on both health and seasonal differences. Both treatments had statistically
insignificant effects on food shortages.
6See Barrett (2002), Dréze, Sen, and Hussain (1995) and Zeller, Schrieder, von Braun, and Heid-
hues (1997) for an overview of the literature on food policies. There is a long literature investigating
the targeting properties and treatment effects of food policies, especially food price subsidies (see, for
example, Besley and Kanbur (1990) and Jha and Ramaswami (2010)).
7There is a smaller but growing literature on consumption smoothing across seasons within an agri-
cultural cycle. See, for example, Sahn (1989); Paxson (1993); Alderman and Garcia (1993); Handa and
Mlay (2006); Chaudhuri and Paxson (2002); Alderman and Sahn (1989); Behrman (1988); Pinstrup-
Anderson and Jaramillo (1989); Khandker (2012). More recently, there have been some randomized
controlled trials related to consumption seasonality (Bryan, Chowdhury, and Mobarak (2013); Beaman,
Karlan, and Thuysbaert (2009)).
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transfers were conditional and, in the case of Hidrobo et al. (2014), included a nutrition
sensitization component. Our results are closer to those of Jensen and Miller (2011),
who find no evidence that price subsidies (in the form of food vouchers for staples)
improved nutrition for poor urban households in two provinces in China.
Our large effects on non-food consumption and reported income, with zero effects
on staple consumption, suggest that the average household in our study could be close
to staple food satiation. This is consistent with preferences where the marginal utility of
staples drops rapidly relative to the marginal utility of other consumption (see Banerjee
and Duflo (2007) and Jensen and Miller (2008) for related discussions of preferences).
This finding is particularly salient if we consider transaction costs associated with
the buying and selling of food, which are likely to be significant given our focus on
remote rural households. Under standard food subsidy programs, transaction costs
of converting cash (or vouchers) to staples might incentivize households against rais-
ing staple consumption. In contrast, our programs directly expand in-kind income, so
households minimize transaction costs by raising staple consumption instead of con-
verting it to other goods.8 Yet, we find fairly precise zero staple effects. This has im-
portant policy implications because staples play a central role in many food programs
in developing countries.9
While our programs generate subsidy-like income and substitution effects, the mech-
anisms are different from standard price subsidies. Our programs subsidize lean season
consumption by introducing new products aimed at sources of seasonal frictions (poor
storage methods and high interest costs for lean season consumption). By raising the
MRT of staples as assets that can be both traded and consumed in the lean season, the
programs subsidize not just lean season staples but all lean season consumption.
The food storage and food credit programs can therefore be viewed as compelling
alternate ways to address seasonal frictions. Other approaches to the problem have
been examined in a number of studies. Khandker, Khaleque, and Samad (2011) find
that government social safety nets reduce both seasonal and non-seasonal insecurity to
a limited extent. As ways to mitigate problems of seasonal famine, Pitt and Khandker
(2002) and Khandker, Khalily, and Samad (2010) study cash-based credit programs
and Bryan, Chowdhury, and Mobarak (2013) study seasonal migration.
Our cost-benefit calculations suggest that our programs are cost-effective interven-
tions. By targeting the sources of seasonal frictions, the programs can persistently
improve the rate at which farmers transfer assets across seasons. We confirm that the
benefits appear to be sustainable using multiple post-treatment surveys. Since the up-
front fixed costs (to purchase storage equipment and seed capital for credit) can be
amortized over time, persistent benefits raise the implied cost-effectiveness of the pro-
grams.10
8As discussed in Ahmed, Quisumbing, Nasreen, Hoddinott, and Bryan (2010), transaction costs are
an important determinant of the impacts of in-kind or cash transfers on food consumption.
9In the Philippines, the rice subsidy program accounts for 70% of public social protection expen-
ditures (Jha and Ramaswami, 2010). Indonesia and India too have large and expensive staple subsidy
programs.
10By contrast, standard in-kind and cash transfers and direct food subsidy programs incur per period,
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We provide some background on West Timor in Section 2, present the theoretical
framework in Section 3, describe the treatments in Section 4, discuss data in Section 5,
lay out the empirical framework in Section 6, discuss results in Section 7, and conclude
in Section 8.
2 Background
West Timor occupies half of the island of Timor. It is in one of Indonesia’s poorest
provinces, where 23% of rural households in this province live in poverty, compared
to 14% for Indonesia (BPS, 2013). Our study focuses on smallholder staple farm-
ers, many of whom are dependent on rain-fed agriculture.11 In our sample, 93% of
household heads reported they were self-employed in the past week and 81% reported
farming as their primary occupation. The climate is characterized by a brief monsoon
(typically between November and January) followed by a long dry spell. While rice
is the primary staple across Indonesia, maize has traditionally been the primary staple
consumed in West Timor.12 Maize is also the primary crop grown in West Timor, fol-
lowed by rice.13 The main harvest seasons occur in April for maize and May-June for
rice.
There is a recurring, annual hunger season known locally as musim paceklik. As
Fox (1977) describes, farmers expect an “ordinary hunger period” of a few months
before each harvest. In our data, 30% of households in the control group report lacking
food in the past month in the harvest season survey compared to 43% in the lean season
survey. As we explain below, there is suggestive evidence that farmers face savings and
credit constraints that could explain the recurrence of these annual lean seasons.
First, existing storage methods have high depreciation rates. The most prevalent
practice of hanging smoked maize from the ceiling leaves it exposed to insects, rodents
and moisture, resulting in an annual depreciation rate of approximately 34% (FAO,
2003). Rice, while less vulnerable than maize, is generally stored in sacks that provide
inadequate protection from infestation. Possibly due to transportation costs or a lack of
infrastructure, inter-island trade is limited. This could also explain why newer storage
technologies have not been introduced locally.
These methods also leave the grain highly visible and subject to what might be
termed "social depreciation", which emerges from community pressures to share.14
recurring costs that do not amortize over time.
11Smallholder subsistence farmers and landless agricultural laborers can both experience consumption
seasonality but with possibly different patterns (see, for example, Sen (1981a,b); Khandker and Mahmud
(2012)). Landless laborers must deal with variation in labor demand while smallholder subsistence
farmers experience food shortages when their food stock depletes before the harvest season.
12In the 1983 village census, 73% of villages in West Timor reported maize as their primary staple
while 17% reported rice.
13According to the 2003 village census, in the average village in West Timor, maize is planted on 53%
of village area and rice is planted on 17%.
14Consider norms that create pressure on households to share visibly stored assets, as in Baland,
Guirkinger, and Mali (2011).
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We collected data on seasonal festival expenditures including amounts spent on own
and others’ festivities. Festival expenditures are important and constitute 20% of non-
food expenditures for the control group. On average, 57% of festival expenditures are
incurred on festivities of others.
Furthermore, there are two types of difficulties associated with saving in cash
(equivalent to selling staple in the harvest season and buying it back the lean season).
First, maize prices are low in the harvest season and high in the lean season.15 Second,
households are constrained by their remoteness–the average household in our dataset is
25.6 km from the nearest market. This suggests significant transaction costs associated
with converting food to cash and back to food.
Credit, when available, is offered at high rates. Informal annual credit interest
rates in West Timor range from 30% to 50%. Indonesia also has a long association
with microfinance. However, Johnston and Morduch (2008) argue that in most cases it
remains unsustainable given the small average loan size. Together, these local features
point to farmers facing seasonal constraints when borrowing against future harvests for
lean season consumption, or when saving in cash or in-kind (due to physical and social
depreciation and price fluctuation).
The Indonesian government’s efforts on food security are centered around a na-
tional rice subsidy program called Raskin. Under this program, basic selection criteria
are applied to all households. Eligible households receive a monthly allowance of rice
(up to 20 kg per household) at subsidized prices. In addition to the high fiscal costs,16
the program suffers from high leakage (Olken, 2006), possibly due to poor targeting.
Finally, as a national program, the timing and provisions under Raskin are not adjusted
to seasonal needs in West Timor.
3 Theoretical Framework
We use a stylized model to illustrate how local features highlighted in Section 2 can ex-
plain the recurrence of annual lean seasons. First, income is seasonal for staple farmers
dependent on rain-fed agriculture. Second, consumption patterns are also seasonal in
the presence of savings and credit constraints. Households cannot smooth consump-
tion across seasons for two reasons–they cannot borrow against future harvests, and
poor storage technologies and seasonal price fluctuations present challenges to saving
in-kind and in cash.
We first demonstrate that a “no-seasonality” benchmark has a harvest-to-lean sea-
son marginal rate of transformation (MRT) of staples equal to one. In contrast, with
savings or credit constraints, seasonal frictions exist (MRT is less than one), which
15In our surveys, we ask households to predict rice and maize prices for different months in a year.
They expect prices to vary significantly for maize but less for rice. The median expected price (per
kilogram) for maize in April (harvest) and January (lean) are 2500 Rp and 4000 Rp, respectively. For
rice, the median expected prices are 6000 Rp for April and 6500 Rp for January. During our study
period, the exchange rate was approximately 9000 Rp to 1 USD.
16In 2009, the cost of Raskin amounted to 0.23% of GDP (Trinugroho et al., 2011).
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means that lean season consumption is expensive relative to the harvest season. Hav-
ing described how seasonal frictions give rise to seasonal consumption patterns in Sec-
tion 3.1, we show in Section 3.2 how food storage and food credit programs address
these frictions by introducing new methods to raise the MRT, thereby functioning as a
subsidies on lean season consumption.
3.1 Autarky: Consumption seasonality under savings and credit
constraints
In any year, there is a harvest period (H) and a lean period (L). In each period, utility is
a function of staple consumption (m) and consumption of a non-food numeraire good
(c). We assume an additively separable utility function: utility in period t is given by
Ut ≡ um,t(mt)+uc,t(ct), where each ui,t is twice differentiable and strictly concave. For
each good i and period t, u′i,t (0) = ∞ (there are no corner solutions).
Income is seasonal. In any harvest period, the farmer receives an endowment of e
units of the staple.17 She must allocate the endowment to consumption in both harvest
and lean periods. For clarity, since we have an in-kind program, we measure units of
consumption in terms of the staple, so that MH represents the amount of endowment
allocated to the harvest season and ML represents the amount allocated to the lean
season. Within each season, the allocated asset amount is divided across the staple
(which has a cash price of pH and pL in harvest and lean, respectively) and non-food
(which has a price of 1).
To isolate the mechanisms that generate variation within, rather than across, agri-
cultural cycles, we assume for now that there is no harvest risk. Since endowments
are identical in each harvest season, the farmer essentially faces a two-period problem
because there is never an incentive to carry resources from one agricultural cycle to the
next. For simplicity, we assume there is no discounting across consecutive periods.
The farmer solves the following utility maximization problem:
max
MH∈[0,e]
VH (MH)+VL (ML) (1)
s.t. ML = η (e−MH) (2)
Here, the indirect utility functions VH (MH) and VL (ML) each represent the maxi-





s.t. ct = pt (Mt−mt) (4)
17This setup can also accommodate labor income in both harvest and lean seasons, which is ignored
for simplicity.
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The slope of the farmer’s inter-seasonal budget constraint (equation (2)) is key to
our analysis. Given an allocation in H, the resulting asset level in L depends on η ,
the marginal rate of transformation (MRT). The inverse of the MRT is the relative cost
of lean season consumption–each unit of assets allocated to the lean season requires
foregoing 1η units in the harvest season.
We model savings and credit constraints as follows. Any staple, s, stored in period
H, becomes γs in period L, with γ < 1. The staple is relatively cheaper in the harvest
period: pH < pL. Finally, borrowing against future harvests incurs a high interest cost
of r > 1 (one unit of borrowed food requires r units of repayment).
Farmers facing savings and credit constraints have difficulty converting endow-
ments in the harvest season to lean season consumption (their MRT is less than one).
The MRT depends on the technology the farmer uses to transfer resources across sea-
sons. If the farmer saves in-kind, then in the lean season she has an asset level of
ML = γ ∗ (e−MH). Alternatively, if she saves in cash, she earns pH ∗ (e−MH) from
sales, which becomes ML =
pH
pL
∗ (e−MH) units of staple in the lean season. Finally,
she could finance her lean season consumption by borrowing and repaying in the fol-
lowing harvest. In this case, ML = 1r (e−MH). Based on this, the farmer chooses
the most effective way to convert resources from the harvest to lean season, so that
η = max{γ, pHpL , 1r }.
The utility maximization problem yields the following first-order conditions:
u′m,H (mH) = (η)u
′
m,L (mL) = (pH)u
′
c,H (cH) = (pLη)u
′
c,L (cL) (5)
In the absence of frictions, η = 1. This is the "no-seasonality" benchmark. In
this case, if utility functions were identical across seasons, consumption too would be
identical across seasons.18
For our target population in West Timor, seasonal frictions exist (characterized in
our model by γ , pHpL and
1
r being less than one) so that the MRT is strictly less than
one. As a consequence, a unit of lean season staple is more expensive than a unit of
harvest season staple. As the first-order conditions show, these frictions cause staple
consumption levels to diverge in favor of the harvest season.
We illustrate the consumption-savings problem in Figure 1. Since VH (MH) and
VL (ML) must be strictly concave, the problem can be described in two dimensions with
a budget constraint and well-behaved indifference curves. The horizontal and vertical
axis depict asset allocations (in staple units) to the harvest and lean seasons, respec-
tively. The horizontal intercept depicts the staple endowment, e. Without seasonal
frictions, the slope of the budget constraint is −1. If preferences were identical across
seasons, the utility-maximizing bundle for the “no-seasonality” benchmark would be
at the intersection of the budget constraint and the 45-degree line, M0.
18This framework also accommodates the possibility that preferences and consumption needs vary
across the agricultural cycle, as in Behrman, Foster, and Rosenzweig (1997). For expositional simplicity,
we do not separately model the cases of consumption for inferior and Giffen foods, as in Jensen and
Miller (2008).
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With seasonal frictions, the budget constraint is flatter because the MRT is less
than one. The agent’s utility maximizing bundle will involve a transfer of assets from
harvest to lean seasons, to a point such as M∗. As the first-order conditions (equation 5)
show, if utility functions are identical across seasons, seasonal frictions result in more
staples being consumed in the harvest season than in the lean season. As we show
below, storage and credit programs that reduce seasonal frictions can raise the MRT,
thereby subsidizing lean season consumption.
3.2 Storage and Credit Programs
We model the storage program as a technological innovation that raises γ to some γ¯ .
As shown in Figure 1, for households that initially faced an MRT of η < γ¯ , the post-
treatment budget constraint pivots upwards. For the same endowment, e, this translates
into an expanded budget set. This is akin to the effect of improved interest rates on sav-
ings. The extent of the expansion of the budget set depends on the difference between
γ¯ and the baseline MRT. Conditional on γ¯ , we expect benefits to be weakly larger for
households with lower baseline γ (under the assumption that r and pHpL are uncorrelated
with the household’s γ).
With credit, the agent has the option to borrow some maize, b, in period L, which is
repaid in period H with interest, as r¯b, where r¯ > 1. If, as we assume, r¯ is sufficiently
low (so that 1r¯ > η), the farmer will choose to fund lean season consumption by bor-
rowing against the next harvest rather than saving from the previous one. The credit
program therefore improves the MRT between harvest and lean season consumptions,
but with a change in timing. In autarky, one unit of lean season staple would require 1η
units of savings in the preceding harvest. Under credit, one unit of lean season staple
requires r¯ units of repayment in the succeeding harvest.19
While storage and credit programs differ in their implementation (as we explain in
Section 4), in the abstract, both programs can be interpreted as technological innova-
tions that help farmers more effectively convert staple output in the harvest season to
lean season consumption. By raising the MRT, both programs lower the cost of lean
season consumption ( 1η ).
Treatment effects can be analyzed within this framework of lean season subsidies.
First, there are across-season effects. The post-treatment consumption bundles under
credit and storage (M¯ and M¯′ in Figure 1 depict two possibilities) depend on the relative
magnitudes of income and substitution effects. The substitution effect should increase
lean season consumption (because ML is relatively cheaper) and decrease harvest sea-
son consumption (MH). If, as we assume, both goods are normal, then income effects
(through the expanded budget set) should increase both ML and MH . We expect total
lean season consumption to be weakly higher (M¯ and M¯′ should be north of M∗ in Fig-
19Our credit programs charged low interest rates so that r¯ is plausibly low enough for credit to be an
improvement over autarky ( 1r¯ > η). The agent might wish to borrow not just for consumption but for
purposes of arbitrage (to sell in the lean season and buy back in the harvest season). We assume, as
explained in Section 4, that there are institutional limits to loan sizes that prevent this.
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ure 1) as a result of both income and substitution effects whereas total harvest season
consumption (MH) may rise or fall since income and substitution effects oppose each
other. If substitution effects dominate, we expect a move to a point such as M¯ (west of
M∗); if income effects dominate, we expect a move to a point such as M¯′ (east of M∗).
Second, the new levels of MH and ML result in new allocations of food and non-
food consumption within each season. These are captured by pure income effects as
depicted in Figure 2. For example, if there is a rise in Mt in any period t, it can be
represented as an outward parallel shift of the within-period budget constraint. The
consumption bundle then moves from (m∗t ,c∗t ) to the new budget line.
How a change in Mt is allocated across mt and ct depends on rates of change of
marginal utilities (u′m,t , u′c,t). Under homothetic utility, we expect a rise in both forms
of consumption, to a point such as (m¯t , c¯t). On the other hand, if individuals are close to
food satiation, most changes will be captured by non-food consumption. A quasilinear
utility function helps demonstrate this point: the first tranches of income are allocated
to food, but additional income gains are directed towards non-food consumption so that
the agent arrives at a point such as (m¯′t , c¯′t).
To summarize, the programs are designed to raise the harvest-to-lean MRT, η . By
raising the returns to the staple farmer’s asset which is either consumed directly or
converted into other consumption, they subsidize both food and non-food in the lean
season. The overall impacts of these subsidies depend on income effects (which raise
all consumption) and substitution effects (which raise lean season consumption and
lower harvest season consumption).
3.3 Risk
Risk can matter differently for credit and storage. We argue that credit is better than
storage at dampening the fluctuations associated with risky outcomes. This happens
through the programs’ interaction with both harvest risk and storage risk.
First, the benefits of storage depend on the realized harvest. Under harvest failure,
if there is nothing to store, there is nothing to be gained from improved storage. Credit,
on the other hand, provides implicit insurance through limited liability (as described in
Section 4). When households experience low harvests from verifiable shocks, they are
permitted to defer their debt until the following harvest.
Second, under storage, households face a risk even after harvest since the technolo-
gies are not foolproof. For example, under certain conditions, stored maize could be
damaged by aflatoxins. While the storage treatment is expected to raise the MRT, the
actual rise in MRT is uncertain. This can limit the ability of households to precisely
close seasonal gaps through storage. Under credit, this risk is absorbed by the program
since the interest rate is fixed and is independent of storage risk. In effect, credit offers
households a fixed MRT while storage does not. Therefore, when comparing consump-
tion between any two consecutive harvest and lean seasons, we expect seasonal gaps to
be lower under credit than under storage. In the remaining sections, we refer to this as
a “seasonal smoothing” effect.
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4 Program Design
Given global concerns about food policy, we were approached by the World Bank in
Jakarta to design and evaluate innovative food security solutions. While both programs
have features that are tailored to West Timor, they share similarities with other food
programs. See Gelay (2008), Lines (2011) and Zeller (2001) for examples of food
storage programs and Khandker and Mahmud (2012) and Mohan et al. (2007) for ex-
amples of credit programs for consumption purposes.
The implementation and evaluation of the programs were funded by the Japanese
Social Development Fund. The treatments were implemented in September 2008 and
lasted 3 years. The programs were implemented by two local NGOs, Yayasan Alfa
Omega (YAO) and Yayasan Tanaoba Lais Manekat (TLM), each of which operated in-
dependently in two districts. Both NGOs were selected because they had experience
implementing cash-based savings and microcredit programs in West Timor. Partici-
pants were informed that the food storage and food credit programs were part of a
three-year pilot, sponsored by the World Bank. Both programs were introduced as new
programs, with no ties to other programs sponsored by the NGOs. All facilitators on
the field were newly hired and trained.
The project covered 96 rural villages across all 4 districts, or kabupatens, in West
Timor. These villages were selected by the NGOs, who were instructed to choose
villages that were far enough from each other to avoid contamination effects.
Treatment assignment was conducted by us and stratified by district. Within each
district, 24 villages were randomly assigned in equal proportions to the control group
(no treatment), or one of three treatment groups (pure storage, contract storage, and
credit, to be discussed below). To be eligible for storage or credit programs, the NGOs
required participants to be married (or once-married) female farmers.
4.1 Storage
The storage treatments were designed to subsidize lean season consumption by loos-
ening the savings constraint which, as described in Section 2, can come from physical
depreciation, social depreciation, and price variation. Individuals were offered storage
materials for free. We implemented two storage treatments: pure storage and commit-
ment storage.
Based on our budget and power calculations, storage groups of up to 108 women
per village were formed through public announcements in the lean season. In total,
there were 2,433 members under Alfa Omega and 2,529 members under TLM. While
grain was stored individually, training was provided at the group level. Participants
were provided with a choice of high capacity drums (180 kg, at a cost of Rp 250,000),
lower capacity jerrycans (40 kg, at a cost of Rp 47,000), and sacks. They were trained
in the required drying methods and provided with warnings about aflatoxins which
can destroy large quantities if the grain is exposed to moisture. Drums were the most
popular method of storage, and more than 80% of stored staples were maize.
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Superior storage not only improve rates of return, it might also reduce household
vulnerability to self-control problems and social pressures.20 To target this problem
further, we assigned a quarter of our villages to a commitment storage treatment. The
commitment storage treatment used the same storage technologies as pure storage.
However, individuals were required to sign a contract under which they agreed to a
restriction on withdrawals until a self-specified date. The contract allowed for early
withdrawals only in the case of explicitly defined and verifiable emergencies. Storage
equipment was then sealed. The implementing NGOs were tasked with carrying out
random audits to check the seal. If the seal was broken before the contracted date, and
if the individual did not have a verifiable emergency, she would be denied future access
to the program. If the pure storage treatment is equivalent to a savings account with
a high interest rate, the contract storage treatment is equivalent to a term fixed deposit
during which savings are made illiquid.
Unfortunately, we found that the distinctions between pure and contract storage
were not strictly adhered to during implementation. In particular, participants in pure
storage too were required to maintain written records specifying anticipated withdrawal
dates. While these were not contractually binding, they served to discourage them from
making intermediate withdrawals as the pure storage program was initially designed to
allow. For these reasons, we do not distinguish between the pure storage and contract
storage treatments in our analysis.21
Given the simplicity of our technological innovation, it is somewhat surprising that
it was not already in use. Part of this can be explained by the difficulty of securing
storage equipment. Small-scale storage materials are not readily available in local
markets. Large storage warehouses in urban areas use oil drums. These are unsuitable
for use at the household level due to transportation difficulties and residual oil. Basic
sacks, while providing protection from moisture, do not provide necessary barriers
against rodents. For the first year, we imported storage products from another island.
Materials arrived too late to be used in the harvest season of year one. This meant
that storage treatments in most areas started in the harvest season of year two. For the
second year, our agricultural specialists managed to locally source sufficiently secure
storage materials.
The cost of the program consists of two main components. The first is procurement
costs used to purchase storage equipment. Procurement costs are one-time, upfront
costs. The average procurement cost per storage participant was 326,366 Rp.22 The
second component consists of implementation costs (mostly wages for facilitators but
also management fees for the NGOs, and indirect costs including rent for offices in the
field). This component is a recurring cost. To divide these costs between storage and
credit, we assume that one third of staff and facilitator time was spent on credit while
20See Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006) for a motivation.
21We repeated the empirical analysis treating pure and contract villages separately. There were no
differences between the two treatment groups.
22Calculated as (714,031,000 Rp+905,395,500 Rp)/(2433 members + 2529 members), where the nu-
merators include the total procurement costs for Alfa Omega villages and TLM villages, respectively.
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two-thirds was spent on storage (the typical facilitator was assigned to three villages
– two storage villages and one credit village). The annual implementation cost for
storage was 254,803 Rp per household.23
4.2 Credit
As the storage program aimed to subsidize lean season consumption by loosening the
savings constraint, the food credit program did the same by loosening the credit con-
straint. It was designed as a staple-based microcredit program, with repayment sched-
ules that target local seasonal patterns. The program was similar to the cash-based
women’s microcredit program created under the Kecamatan Development Project (see
Olken (2007) for more details), except that we offered staple food rather than cash loans
and focused on financing lean season staple consumption instead of income-generating
activities.
In September 2008, the NGOs introduced the program at churches and through
local leaders’ networks. As with storage, credit groups of up to 108 eligible women
were formed in each treated village. Groups then elected their internal leaders and
administrators. In total, there were 1229 and 1374 credit participants in Alfa Omega
and TLM villages, respectively.
Disbursement and repayment were timed to match local seasonal patterns. In the
middle of each lean season (typically between December and January), participants
filled out forms to request the amount and type of staple they wished to borrow. The
loans were to be repaid in kind, with interest, after the following harvest (typically
between April and June). The credit groups held meetings to determine a common date
for the disbursement of food. The repayment date was determined by the anticipated
timing of the participant’s harvest. In practice, most loan terms were approximately 6
months.
The seed capital for the credit program was gifted to the groups. This was used to
facilitate grain procurement and storage equipment. Group members voted to borrow
either rice or maize. Grain to be used for credit was then sourced from nearby districts
by the NGOs and the group leaders. In our data, 45% of all loans issued were rice and
55% were maize.
Facilitators collected data on plot size and previous harvests to determine loan ca-
pacity, which ranged from 50 kg to 200 kg per member. This externally imposed loan
ceiling ensured that participants could not borrow unlimited amounts for the purposes
of arbitrage. For maize, the mean loan was 85 kg and the median was 50 kg. For rice,
the mean loan was 95 kg and the median was 100 kg.
Loans accumulated simple interest at the rate of 1.5% per month (measured by
23The total implementation costs over three years were 3,072,618,032 Rp for Alfa Omega and
2,616,875,216 Rp for TLM (the annual implementation costs are calculated by dividing by 3 years).
The annual implementation cost for storage was calculated as ( 23 ) ∗ ( 13years ) ∗ (3,072,618,032 +
2,616,875,216)/(2,433+ 2,529). If we include both one-time procurement costs and annual imple-
mentation costs, the average cost per storage participant would be 581,169 Rp.
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weight) with a loan fee of 1.5%. In general, households paid an accumulated 10.5%
interest in the harvest season.24 This suggests an improved MRT, given existing esti-
mates of retention rates under traditional storage (around 66%, as discussed in Section
2). While training and monthly meetings happened at the group level, lending and lia-
bility were individual. The punishment for default was permanent expulsion from the
groups. Exceptions were made for natural catastrophes and harvest failures. In these
cases, households were permitted to roll over debt to the following agricultural cycle.
Repaid grain was stored in drums and sacks until the next round of disbursement.
While the program grant was used as seed money to provide the first round of loans,
repaid food was expected to sustain future loans. Since the credit program also took
advantage of superior storage technologies, relatively low interest rates were sustain-
able. Furthermore, the credit contract provided implicit insurance in two ways. First,
by allowing households to roll over debt, it protected borrowers from harvest risk. Sec-
ond, by lending at a fixed interest rate, it protected borrowers from the storage risk they
would face if storing on their own, as discussed in Section 3.3.
Repayment rates were 100% except in instances of harvest failure, when debt was
deferred to the following harvest. In the first and third years, TLM villages faced
major harvest failures (repayment rates in these harvest periods were initially 60% and
4%). In the second year, some Alfa Omega villages faced harvest failures (repayment
rates were initially 80%). For harvest failures in the first two years, full repayment
was received within one year of default. We do not have data on repayment following
harvest failures in the third year as the formal program had ended by that time. The
high repayment rates strongly suggest that such a program can be self-sustaining.
For credit, the average procurement cost per credit participant was 727,488 Rp.25
This was used to purchase and transport the first loan disbursements to the credit vil-
lages. For credit, the annual implementation cost per participant was 242,861 Rp.26
5 Data
Enumerators visited 2,877 agricultural households twice each year for three years, once
during the lean season and once during the harvest season.We had two main surveys, a
household survey (the main survey) and an individual survey (to collect demographic
information about household members). The surveys were administered by the agri-
cultural institute of a local university, Lembaga Penelitian Undana. We had to drop 7
households because we could not merge information from the two sets of surveys (their
household identifiers were not the same across the household and individual surveys).
24The terms were based on standard contracts under SPP (the women’s microcredit program under
KDP) and other microcredit programs (including those offered by TLM and YAO).
25Calculated as (1,408,868,000 Rp+484,784,000 Rp)/(1229 members + 1374 members), where the
numerators are the procurement costs for Alfa Omega villages and TLM villages respectively.
26This was calculated as, ( 13 )∗ ( 13years )∗ (3,072,618,032+2,616,875,216)/(1,229+1,374). If we
include both one-time procurement costs and annual implementation costs, the average cost per credit
participant was 970,349 Rp.
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There was no attrition. Therefore, our final sample comprises 2,870 households (713
from control villages, 720 from credit villages and 1,437 from storage villages) and
17,220 observations (at the household-season level).
Figure 3 describes the timing of the surveys in relation to harvest seasons (April
to June, in italics) and lean seasons (November to February, in bold). There were six
survey rounds. Odd-numbered rounds (1, 3 and 5) correspond to lean season surveys
and even-numbered rounds correspond to harvest season surveys. Column 1 shows that
the first round was conducted between September and November 2008, just before the
start of the lean season. Because many of the villages were extremely remote, each
survey round took two to three months to complete. Due to budget delays, the first two
harvest season surveys (rounds 2 and 4) were delayed by 3 months and began in July.
The following columns in Figure 3 show how the timing of the surveys coincided
with the treatments. For credit, food disbursements occurred between the months of
December and January (the peak of the lean season) and repayments were around har-
vest months (April to June). Comparing columns 1 and 2, we can see that credit has
five rounds of surveys post treatment (rounds 2 to 6) and one pre-treatment round that
was conducted in the lean season. For credit, we do not have a pre-treatment harvest
season survey.
For storage, the final column shows that equipment only arrived between July and
August of 2009 (coinciding with round 2, in column 1). Since this was already sev-
eral months after the first harvest, little was stored until the subsequent harvest season
(round 4). Therefore, we define rounds 4 to 6 as post treatment rounds for storage. We
have one pre-treatment harvest survey and two pre-treatment lean surveys.
Column 1 of Table 1 reports the baseline means of the control group. The average
age of the household head is 44.8 years. 78% of household heads have completed pri-
mary school and 24.1% have completed lower secondary school (9 years of schooling).
Only 6.7% report having savings in a bank account. The average household has 4.832
members. Staples are an important food item. The average individual consumes 40.88
kilocalories from rice and maize per month (or 1.36 kilocalories per capita per day).
This is about 65% of the minimum recommended daily energy level commonly used
in poverty statistics (2.1 kilocalories) and 70% of the average calorie intake per capita
per day (1.96 kilocalories) in rural Indonesia in 2010 (BPS, 2013). Other studies have
also found that about 60% to 70% of calories in the typical poor person’s diet comes
from the primary staple in the region (see, for example, Jensen and Miller (2011)).
Describing key outcomes
We have four categories of outcomes, which we report in four panels in all tables.
We explain how these variables are constructed in Table A1 in the Appendix. The
first category (Panel A in the tables) includes common measures of overall well-being,
including log(Staple consumed, kCal),27 log(Non-food expenditure), log(Reported in-
come). All these are reported as per capita monthly measures. Reported income is the
27Staple consumption is calculated as rice consumed plus maize consumed (both in calories), as these
are the two main staples.
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amount households report as their income (from harvest sales, wages, remittances and
gifts) in the past month. Since we are taking logs, we miss some observations that are
zeros. The appendix includes details on the construction of key outcomes and related
data issues.
The second category includes measures of seasonal differences in consumption and
income (Panel B). For each agricultural cycle, we calculate the absolute difference be-
tween the harvest and lean season levels of staple consumption, non-food expenditure
and income.28 For example, the seasonal gap in log(Staple consumed) is measured
as the absolute difference between rounds 2 and 3 and the absolute difference between
rounds 4 and 5. We discuss why we use absolute differences instead of pure differences
in the appendix, where we also report results using pure differences.
The third category includes indicator variables meant to capture food shortages
(Panel C). This outcome is of independent interest because food security is commonly
defined as having access to adequate food at any time (Khandker and Mahmud, 2012).
By asking households to report whether they think they have or expect to have adequate
food, these indicators capture the extensive margin of food shortages, while calories
consumed (reported in Panel A) capture the intensive margin.29 We have four outcomes
in Panel C. The first three measure whether households expect to have adequate food in
the following January, the following November (both lean seasons) and the following
April (harvest season). The fourth is an indicator of whether households faced a food
shortage in the past month. To summarize, Panel C measures anticipated food access
for future months and reported food access in the past month.
The final category includes self-reported measures related to health (Panel D). We
have three variables–an indicator variable of whether the household was unable to af-
ford health expenditures in the past month, the number of household members who
reported any sickness in the past three months, and the total number of sick days re-
ported (totaled over all members who reported they were sick in the past three months).
The last two health outcomes are scaled in per capita per month units so that we do not
have the mechanical effect of larger household sizes leading to more reported sick days
and more reported sick persons.
We use these four categories to measure whether our treatments improved well-
being. Improvements in consumption and income (Panel A) and health (Panel D) and
reductions in food shortages (Panel C) are associated with improvements in well-being.
Reductions in seasonal gaps (Panel B) can be interpreted as a welfare improvement,
under the assumption of identical, separable, and concave utility functions for both
seasons (more details are in the appendix). Panels A, C and D are common in the
literature on food policies and the Panel B is specific to seasonality.
A limitation of our data is that we only collected food intake information for a few
food items. We have consumption measures for primary staples (rice and maize, which
typically represent 60% to 70% of household calories) and other major food items
28For seasonal differences, we use differences in the monthly non-food expenditure items only.
29These measures also account for the possibility that household calorie needs vary in unobserved
ways (Jensen and Miller, 2010), so that “adequate” is a subjective notion.
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(cassava, fruits and beans). For budgetary reasons, we did not collect data on other
foods such as meat and seafood. As a result, we are unable to build a truly compre-
hensive measure of food consumption. If households substituted towards consuming
non-staples not measured by us, our analysis will miss this margin of adjustment.
Multiple outcomes and mean effects analysis
To address concerns associated with having many outcomes, we follow Kling,
Liebman, and Katz (2007) and use mean effects analysis. We group outcomes into the
four categories above and then construct a summary index for each category. For each
category with Y1, ...,YK outcomes, we calculate the standardized outcomes, y1, ...,yK ,
as the outcome, Yk, minus its baseline mean in the control group, divided by the base-
line standard deviation in the control group.30 Finally, we create the summary index
by averaging over all K standardized outcomes. The Consumption and Income Index
and the Heatlh Index are defined so that an increase in the index is desirable. The Food
Shortage Index and Seasonal Gap Index are defined so that a reduction is desirable.
Using a summary index avoids the over-testing problem because each index is one
regression and the probability of false rejection does not increase as we add outcomes
to the index. The downside is that it is hard to interpret the indices. If we find that an
index increased, we would like to know which components are significant in isolation.
Therefore, in each table, we report results on both the summary index for each category
of outcomes and the individual coefficients. Mean effects analysis is widely used by
other randomized control trials.31 Given the large number of outcomes, we focus on
reporting results that are significant at the 1% or 5% levels only.
Balance checks
Table 1 reports results from tests of whether treatment and control villages are bal-
anced, using the first survey round. Columns 2 to 5 report results from OLS regressions
comparing storage to control villages, controlling for district fixed effects and cluster-
ing standard errors at the village level. We report p-values for tests of the coefficient
on the treatment indicator being zero. Columns 6 to 8 report results for credit versus
control villages. The full estimation samples include 2,150 households for storage and
1,433 households for credit. The outcomes are organized into six panels: Panels A
30It is more common to standardize using the contemporaneous means and standard deviations for
the control group. However, we chose to use the baseline control group mean and standard deviation
because of the mis-assignment problem discussed in the next section (three villages assigned as controls
were treated).
31An alternative approach is to make Bonferroni adjustments. The basic Bonferroni adjustment calcu-
lates upper bounds for family-wise error rates by multiplying the per comparison p-value by the number
of estimates within a family of hypotheses. This bound is the exact family-wise p-value when the out-
comes in the family are independent of each other. Intuitively, the Bonferroni adjustments have lower
statistical power when the outcomes are highly correlated, as in our case. For example, in Panel C,
anticipation of food shortages in January, April and November are likely to be highly correlated so that
Bonferroni would result in adjusted p-values that are too high. In other words, the upper bound is less
informative because we would fail to reject too often. See Kling and Liebman (2004) for more details.
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to D correspond to the outcomes reported in the remaining tables, Panel E examines
agricultural production and storage behavior and Panel F reports baseline household
characteristics.
For storage, one outcome out of 25 tests has a p-value at or below 5%. In Panel
F, Number of motorcycles owned has a mean difference of 0.051 and a p-value of
0.8% (compared to the control group mean of 0.067). However, a difference of 0.051
motorcycles seems small and economically insignificant. For credit, one out of 25 tests
has a p-value at or below 5% (1(Anticipate food shortage in November) in Panel C has
a p-value of 4.7%). This baseline difference is the opposite of those in our results, so
it biases us against our findings. Importantly, all our results are robust to controlling
for baseline values for the dependent variable and controlling for baseline differences
in household characteristics reported in Panel F in Table 1 (including the Number of
motorcycles owned).
6 Estimation
Our main specification is an instrumental variable regression that compares treatment
and control villages, and pools all post treatment survey rounds.
yivd = α+β1TAKEUPivd+θd+ εivd (6)
where yivd is the outcome for household i, in village v in district d. We use the
treatment assignments (TREATvd) to instrument for a dummy that is 1 if household
i participated in the programs (TAKEUPivd). The take-up rate for credit was 40%
and the take-up rate for storage was 42%. All specifications control for district fixed
effects, θd , since treatment was assigned randomly across villages within each district.
We estimate the regressions separately for credit and for storage. Standard errors are
clustered at the village level.
The key parameter of interest is β1. An improvement in well-being would be as-
sociated with increases in consumption and income levels and improvements in health
(β1 > 0 in Panels A and D) and decreases in seasonal differences and food shortages
(β1 < 0 for Panels B and C).
As discussed in the theory, both seasonal food programs were designed to subsidize
lean season consumption by raising the harvest-to-lean MRT of staples. By doing so,
the treatments can generate income and substitution effects. While we do not estimate
these effects separately, under some assumptions, we can detect which effects are dom-
inant by observing the signs of the overall effects on consumption in each season. For
normal goods, both substitution and income effects increase lean season consumption
(β1 > 0) while substitution and income effects have opposing effects on harvest season
consumption (β1 > 0 if the income effect dominates or β1 < 0 if the substitution effect
dominates). Therefore, the sign of the overall effect on harvest season outcomes indi-
cates which effect is dominant.32 If harvest consumption increases, income effects are
32For inferior goods, income and substitution effects are opposite-signed for lean season consumption.
18
dominant, pointing to budget set expansions and unambiguous welfare improvements.
However, decreases in harvest season consumption have ambiguous welfare implica-
tions. They are consistent with dominant substitution effects but also with budget set
contractions.
Unfortunately, due to a mis-communication, TLM assigned the wrong treatment
for nine villages. To address this, we report our main results using only the intended
assignment. We also report estimates for each NGO separately in the appendix (Ta-
bles A5 and A6). These estimates by NGO remain internally valid since each NGO
managed two districts and random assignment was stratified by district. We believe the
mis-assignment error is orthogonal to unobserved village characteristics. The assign-
ment was performed by the authors who were based in the United States at the time
of assignment. The treatment assignment was sent via email but one NGO mistakenly
used the treatment assignment from an older email. When we estimate treatment ef-
fects by NGO, the results tend to be more significant for Alfa Omega villages than for
TLM villages. This suggests our results are not driven by mis-assignment as there was
no mis-assignment in Alfa Omega villages.
7 Results
We present our main results in Section 7.1, discuss robustness checks in 7.2, describe
mechanisms in 7.3, and provide cost benefit calculations in 7.4.
7.1 Main results
Columns 1-3 of Table 2 report IV estimates for the storage treatment compared to the
control group. Each pair of cells in this table reports an IV estimate of β1 in equation
6 and its standard error. We report results using all post treatment seasons (column
1), lean seasons only (column 2) and harvest seasons only (column 3). Similarly, we
report results for credit compared to the control group in columns 5 to 7. Columns
4 and 8, labeled N(All), report sample sizes for IV regressions using all seasons. We
first discuss the impacts of storage and credit on consumption and reported income
(Panel A). This is our main result. We then discuss effects on seasonal differences in
consumption and income (Panel B), effects on food shortages (Panel C) and on health
(Panel D).
The main result is an increase in the Consumption and Income Index by 0.246 units
for storage (Panel A, column 1) and by 0.267 units in the harvest season for credit
(column 7). For storage, the treatment effects are similar for both lean (0.188) and
harvest seasons (0.277).33 As discussed in Section 6, these increases, particularly in
Substitution effects are always positive for lean season consumption and negative for harvest season
consumption. But income effects depend on whether goods are normal or inferior.
33The harvest season effect is significant at the 5% level, but the lean season effect is not statistically
significant. This is probably because, for storage, we have two post-treatment harvest season surveys
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the harvest season, are consistent with dominant income effects coming from budget
set expansions.
For storage, the increase in the Consumption and Income Index is driven by a 31.1%
and a 33.2% increase in non-food expenditure in the lean and harvest seasons, respec-
tively.34 The most responsive expenditure margins are personal consumption goods.
For credit, the increase in the Consumption and Income Index is driven by increases in
reported income (66.2% in the harvest season).35 As we do not observe decreases in
consumption, the higher reported income is consistent with increases in the consump-
tion of other goods not measured by us (this could include other food items, such as
meat and seafood, or other non-food items).
We estimate precise zero effects on staple food consumption. The effect on calories
consumed from staples is 1.4% (for storage) and 6% (for credit). When we repeat the
regression in levels scaled to per capita per day units, we estimate a decrease of 4.484
calories per capita per day (for storage) and an increase of 124.4 calories (for credit).
This is not due to a lack of variation in calories consumed. The control group has
a baseline mean of 1360 calories per capita per day and a standard deviation of 853
calories (Table 1).
Given that the policy reduced the relative cost of lean season consumption, substi-
tution effects should increase staple consumption in the lean season. However, we do
not detect this increase. Moreover, transaction costs (which are likely to be significant
for rural households) should bias us towards finding effects on staple consumption (rel-
ative to other goods), since our programs focus on staples, instead of vouchers or cash.
This makes the null effects on staples more striking. We cannot rule out increases in
other food items, including some sources of protein, due to data limitations. However,
we did collect data on a few other food items (fruits, beans and cassava) and did not
detect any changes on their consumption patterns.
As shown in Figure 2, the null treatment effects along the staple food margin are
consistent with the marginal utility of staples diminishing more rapidly than marginal
utilities of other forms of consumption. In our model, the generalized utility function
is agnostic on this, but more specific functional form assumptions (such as quasilinear
utility, a reasonable conjecture in this setting) could explain this pattern. These results
suggest the average household could be close to staple food satiation. This would be
consistent with the types of food preferences observed in Banerjee and Duflo (2007)
(rounds 4 and 6) but only one for the lean season (round 5).
34This increase is large compared to the value of the storage equipment households received for free.
Most households in the storage treatment received storage equipment valued between 47,000 Rp and
250,000 Rp. In each of the three post treatment survey rounds for storage, total non-food expenditure
(per month per household) increased by 55,000 Rp, 76,000 Rp and 76,000 Rp, respectively. The overall
cost-effectiveness, of course, depends on how we annualize these effects on monthly expenditures. We
discuss this in Section 7.4.
35The effect on reported income is mostly driven by increases in income from sales of harvest output
rather than wages, remittances or gifts. This is consistent with the model. Credit offers a cheaper way
to fund lean season consumption. If the household chooses not to raise lean season consumption (as in
this case), it is now able to sell more of its harvest output to fund other forms of consumption.
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and Jensen and Miller (2008). Now that we have discussed level effects, we turn to
seasonal differences.
Panel B shows that credit has seasonal smoothing effects but storage does not. For
storage, the effects on the Seasonal Gap Index are relatively precise zero effects (the
95% confidence interval ranges from -0.178 to 0.124 standardized units). For credit, the
effect on the Seasonal Gap Index is statistically insignificant, but the absolute seasonal
gap in the log of monthly non-food expenditure items declines by 0.16 units.36 The
mean seasonal gap in monthly non-food expenditure items for the control group in the
baseline is 10,406 Rp. When we estimate treatment effects by survey rounds, we find
that most of the decline occurs in the first cycle (|round 2-round 3|) and appears to
be driven by decreases in harvest season consumption (round 2) and increases in lean
season consumption (round 3). This is consistent with our discussion in Section 3.3
that explains features of the credit program that insure participants against harvest risk
and storage risk, which could explain why credit appears to have stronger seasonal
smoothing effects than storage. Turning to the Food Shortage Index in Panel C, we see
that the effects are largely negative, but statistically insignificant.
Finally, Panel D reports health effects. For storage, the health effects are close to
zero with relatively narrow confidence intervals (the 95% confidence interval ranges
from -0.146 to 0.145 standardized units, Panel D, column 1). For credit, we find in-
significant effects on health when we pool both seasons. Reported health is better in
the lean season (the Health Index is 0.188 higher though this is not significant) but is
worse in the harvest season (the Health Index is lower by 0.330 units). This is driven by
a 10.5% higher likelihood of households reporting a difficulty to meet health expendi-
ture payments, 0.185 more sick days per capita per month and a 0.6% higher likelihood
that a household member reported any sickness in a month. While the deterioration in
health in the harvest season is a concern, it is reassuring that the magnitudes are not
large and that the overall health effects (using all seasons) are insignificant.
In summary, both storage and credit led to sizeable increases in the Consumption
and Income Index, driven by increases in non-food expenditure and reported income
but with zero effects on staple consumption. Credit had some seasonal smoothing ef-
fects (driven by smaller seasonal differences in monthly non-food expenditure items).
But there was also moderately worse reported health in the harvest season, with no ef-
fects on overall health when we pool both seasons. Storage had zero seasonal smooth-
ing and health effects. The effects on food shortages are inconclusive because the
standard errors are too large.
7.2 Robustness checks
Table 3 reports robustness checks. Column 1 reports the main IV results of Table 2.
Column 2 controls for the value of the dependent variable in the baseline. Column
36When calculating seasonal differences, we only include differences in monthly non-food expendi-
ture items (rent, utilities, health bills and personal consumption items).
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3 adds baseline values for all household characteristics reported in Panel F of Table
1. These two specifications are included because we might be concerned that pre-
determined differences shown in the balance checks reported in Table 1 are driving the
treatment effect estimates. Column 4 reports OLS estimates. Columns 5 to 8 report
similar robustness checks for credit.37 For all specifications, we only report results that
pool all seasons (instead of one table for each specification). The results for lean and
harvest season surveys are broadly similar.
For both treatments, the results are robust across all specifications. The estimates
for staple consumption remain close to zero and the consumption effects remain large
for storage. For credit, the effect on income remains high for the harvest season (not
reported). The OLS estimates are about half of the IV estimates (in line with take up
rates that are around 40% for both treatments). Importantly, the results are robust to
controlling for baseline differences (columns 2, 3, 6 and 7), suggesting the baseline
differences reported in Table 1 are most likely due to sampling error, and that treat-
ment versus control differences in post treatment outcomes are not caused by observed
baseline differences.
7.3 Mechanisms
Other budget set effects
The main mechanism by which both programs expand budget sets is through the
raising of the harvest-to-lean MRT. In the theory, the budget constraint (equation 2)
included only agricultural endowments and assumed away other sources of revenue
that could give rise to income effects, including wages and private transfers (gifts and
remittances). We explore these potential mechanisms in Table 4.
We see that neither program affected other budget set factors, providing further
support that the income effects above are directly due to the programs’ effect on MRT.
One concern is that the null staple effects might arise because our transfers are exactly
offset or crowded out by other transfers. If this is true, then we should see decreases in
the receipt of private transfers (gifts and remittances). Table 4 shows that the treatments
did not affect these transfers (columns 1 and 2) nor did it affect wage income (column
3). Another concern is that staple consumption might have increased at the household
level but not at the per capita level if household size increased. Column 4 shows that
this is not the case.
Evidence of savings constraints loosening under storage
Further analysis suggests that the main mechanism behind the effects of storage on
consumption is an alleviation of the savings constraint, as discussed in the model. We
37We also tried estimating specifications with household fixed effects and testing for differences be-
tween treatment and control groups but the standard errors were large. Since treatment was randomly
assigned at the village level, the household fixed effect specification that uses within household variation
also loses much of the useful between-village variation.
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have two pieces of suggestive evidence. First, we conducted a heterogeneous treatment
effects analysis for households that are ex ante savings constrained versus households
that are not. As discussed in Section 3.2, we expect stronger effects for households
with below median retention rates (our proxy for households who are more likely sav-
ings constrained) because income effects are driven by expansions in the budget set.
The magnitude of this expansion depends on differences between the baseline reten-
tion rates and γ¯ (the retention rate under the new storage technology), where the im-
provement will be more significant for households with lower baseline retention rates.
Indeed, Table A4 in the appendix shows that the effect is mostly concentrated amongst
households who are ex ante savings constrained (the interaction terms with indicators
for low-retention-rate households are statistically significant).38 We explain the het-
erogeneous treatment effect regressions in the appendix.
Second, we investigate another proxy for savings constraints–the need to contribute
to neighbors’ festival expenditures. Storage participants could circumvent this con-
straint by committing to store harvest for the lean season. To test this, we calculate
the share of a household’s annual festival expenditures that is used for neighbors’ fes-
tivities. We find that storage participants report a 9% reduction in this share for all
villages (though this is not significant) and a 22.2% reduction in Alfa Omega villages
(1% sig.). This reduction for Alfa Omega villages is consistent with the mechanism de-
scribed above, where commitment (formal or informal) associated with storage raised
storage retention rates, γ .
7.4 Cost benefit analysis
We calculate the benefits-to-program cost ratio, which provides one way to compare
our programs to others. Our preferred estimate for the numerator (benefits) is the annu-
alized effect on consumption and income levels. This misses other effects (such as food
shortages, health and seasonal smoothing effects) that are harder to monetize without
estimating household preferences. However, it has the advantage of being transparent
and comparable to other papers. For the denominator (program costs), our preferred
estimate includes the average procurement costs per household (326,366 Rp for storage
and 727,488 Rp for credit, as discussed in Section 4).
To calculate annualized benefits for storage, we use the result that storage had statis-
tically significant effects on ln(Non-food expenditures) in both harvest and lean seasons
(Table 2, Panel A). We repeated the exercise using monthly non-food expenditure lev-
els for households (this includes observations with zero non-food expenditures, which
is more conservative). The IV estimate of the treatment effect on monthly non-food
expenditures for households is 70,000 Rp.39 The annualized benefit, then, is (70,000
38To construct baseline retention rates, we need pre-treatment data for both harvest and lean seasons
(round 2 and round 3 for storage). We cannot construct baseline retention rates for credit since there is
no pre-treatment harvest data.
39For the cost-effectiveness calculations, we use effects on consumption and income at the household
level because the cost measures are calculated at the household level (we take total program costs divided
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Rp)*2 because expenditures increased statistically significantly for both harvest and
lean season surveys, suggesting that, at minimum, the treatment effect led to improve-
ments in two months per year.
Therefore, the benefit-to-cost ratio for storage, using annualized benefits and aver-
age procurement costs, is 43% (=140,000 Rp/326,366 Rp). This measure implies that
improvements in monthly non-food expenditures would cover the upfront cost of the
program used to purchase the storage equipment within 2.3 years.
For credit, the benefit-to-cost ratio is 53%. Credit had a statistically significant
effect on ln(Reported income) in the harvest season. The IV estimate of the treatment
effect on quarterly household income is 389,000 Rp. Therefore, the benefit-to-cost
ratio is 53% (=389,000/727,488), assuming the effect on income lasts only one quarter.
This measure implies that improvements in quarterly household income would cover
the upfront cost of the program used to purchase the seed capital within 1.9 years
(calculated as 727,488/389,000).
A critical parameter is how sustainable our treatment effects are. The longer the
benefits persist, the more we can amortize the upfront procurement costs, which would
increase the benefit-to-cost ratios. One limitation of our study is that we only have
surveys over a three-year span. Within our study period, our estimates suggest largely
positive effects for each round of survey post treatment (but the standard errors are
large if we do not pool the post treatment surveys). Moreover, the persistently high
repayment rates (even when there were widespread harvest failures) suggest that the
credit program can be sustainable over multiple years. Therefore, we make the conser-
vative assumption that our programs’ benefits persist for two years (because we only
surveyed households for 2 years, post treatment).40 If we use annuitized procurement
costs in the denominator, the benefit-to-cost ratios are 74% for storage and 93% for
credit.
We benchmark these estimates against those for Raskin, a large rice subsidy pro-
gram in Indonesia (discussed in Section 2). Tabor (2005) estimates that the transfer
benefit per unit cost for Raskin is 52% for targeted beneficiaries. This assumes a leak-
age rate of 16%. However, the The World Bank (2005) estimates that only 18% of the
Raskin budget translates into a subsidy for poor households, suggesting a higher leak-
age rate. With a higher leakage rate, the benefit-to-cost ratio for Raskin would be lower
than 52% because fewer benefits are reaching the targeted beneficiaries (the numerator
is lower).
We also compared our estimates to other in-kind and cash transfer programs. Hod-
dinott, Skoufias, and Washburn (2000) report that consumption for Mexican house-
holds receiving Opportunidades benefits valued at 197 pesos per month increased by
151 pesos, translating to a benefit-to-cost ratio of 77%. Importantly, rice subsidies,
by total number of participants, which is the total number of households since each household can only
have one participant).
40We calculated this by annuitizing the procurement costs reported above using a discount rate of 10%
(a standard assumption in the literature). The annuitized procurement costs for storage and for credit
were 188,049 Rp and 419,172 Rp per household, respectively.
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cash and in-kind transfers are financed by per-period costs (equivalent to the cost of the
transfers) while our programs are financed from one-time costs to procure seed capital
and storage equipment, which can be amortized over time if benefits are persistent.
In summary, our benefit-to-cost estimates for storage and credit are 43% and 53%
respectively. These numbers are comparable to the 52% estimate for Raskin and the
77% estimate for Opportunidades, except, the denominator of our benefit-to-cost ratios
include one-time procurement costs. Amortizing procurement costs over 2 years (a
conservative assumption) increases our benefit-to-cost ratios to 74% for storage and
93% for credit.41
8 Conclusion
This paper focuses on the problem of seasonal food security for rural agricultural
households. We use a simple consumption-savings model to frame the problem. Farm-
ers with seasonal incomes must rely on savings or credit technologies to transfer assets
across seasons. Under savings constraints (in kind and in cash) and credit constraints,
the opportunity cost of lean season consumption is high. We describe this as a case
of seasonal frictions, which are encapsulated by a harvest-to-lean season MRT of food
that is smaller than one.
As described in Section 1, there are a number of potential ways to help house-
holds smooth consumption in the face of seasonal frictions. We propose and test two
programs designed to raise the harvest-to-lean MRT, thereby subsidizing lean season
consumption. By allowing households to either save more effectively (food storage) or
borrow cheaply (food credit), the programs aimed to expand budget sets and improve
the rate at which harvest season assets could be converted into lean season consump-
tion. In this sense, our solutions can be viewed as addressing the basic problem of
households lacking access to high MRT technologies for transferring food across sea-
sons.
Our evaluation indicates improvements in economic well-being that are consistent
with positive income effects arising from expanded budget sets. Both storage and credit
led to increases in non-food consumption or reported income but had zero effects on
staple consumption. Storage had no seasonal smoothing effects but credit did, though,
under credit, health in the harvest season deteriorated moderately. Since the programs
41These ignore the annual implementation costs (mainly used to pay facilitators) discussed in Section
4. The annual implementation costs that are recurring include 254,803 Rp for storage and 242,861 Rp
for credit. In practice, in the long run, these implementation costs would not be so high for storage
once communities learn to use the storage equipment and for credit, the programs were designed so
they could be easily added as a component of a national women’s microcredit program (mentioned in
Section 4.2). To be comprehensive, we also provide calculations that include implementation costs
as well. Without amortization, if we include one-time procurement costs and annual implementation
costs in the denominator, the benefit-to-cost ratios are 24% for storage (= 140,000326,366+254,803 ) and 40%
for credit. If we use annuitized procurement costs instead, the benefit-to-cost ratios are 32% for storage
(= 140,000188,049+254,803 ) and 59% for credit (where the denominator includes the annuitized procurement costs
and the annual implementation costs).
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incur front-loaded costs and have recurring financial benefits, our cost-benefit analysis
argues that they provide a cost-effective way to help farmers adapt to seasonality.
The food storage and food credit programs, when modified with caution, could
inform food policy elsewhere. Rudimentary food storage technologies are prevalent
in several agrarian economies, and the introduction of improved storage (used directly
for storage programs or indirectly for credit programs, as discussed in Sections 3.2 and
4.1) could similarly expand budget sets for other poor households. Our research comes
with some caveats and suggestions for ongoing investigation.
First, unlike regular subsidies on staples, these programs are of less immediate
value to non-farming households whose incomes are not seasonal and not in kind. Un-
less such households could replicate the behavior of farming households by conducting
basic transactions using staples, they cannot take advantage of the lean season subsidy
implicit in storage and credit. This is because our programs have no direct effects on
prices.
Second, our programs are expected to have persistent effects from the initial invest-
ments in storage equipment and seed capital. Since we have data spanning only three
years, we are unable to measure persistence over a longer term. It is important to note
that our cost structure is fundamentally different from that of regular price subsidies
which incur recurring costs. As a result, a longer-term analysis would be expected to
raise the implied cost-effectiveness of the programs.
Third, given the limited scale of our programs, we do not observe general equilib-
rium effects. A sufficiently large expansion of the programs should ultimately reduce
the staple supply in the harvest season and raise the staple supply in the lean season.
This will translate into a drop in lean season staple prices and a rise in harvest season
staple prices. While these general equilibrium effects arise out of improved storage or
credit markets, welfare effects for some households will be ambiguous. For example,
consider a household that had access to a high-returns storage technology prior to the
program and therefore did not experience a direct expansion of its budget set through
food credit or food storage. In the short run, such a household will be unaffected by
the programs. However, as a result of general equilibrium effects, since staples are
expected to get cheaper in the lean season, lean season non-food consumption will get
more expensive (relative to staples). If the household has a preference for lean season
non-food consumption (that it funds through saved staples), it will be made worse off.
Fourth, we cannot rule out program effects on some forms of non-staple food con-
sumption. In particular, recall that the credit program finds a rise in income with no
discernible changes in consumption. Presumably the additional income translates into
either forms of consumption that we do not measure (such as meat) or savings. It would
be instructive to better understand where these changes lie.
Finally, it is interesting that the positive consumption and income effects of our pro-
grams are stronger in the harvest season. This is particularly noteworthy for credit, as it
suggests households on average are not over-borrowing in a way that leaves them with
little to consume after repayments in the harvest. It would be useful to learn how these
results depend on time preferences or social or spousal pressures to share. For instance,
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do time-inconsistent agents borrow more in the lean season and save less in the harvest
season? Existing theoretical and empirical work suggests that the impacts of savings
and credit depend on time preferences in nuanced and sometimes unexpected ways.42
Given the encouraging results from our program evaluation, modified designs based
on the preferences and other characteristics of target populations have the potential to
substantially raise consumption and welfare.
42See Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006); Basu (2014)
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Figure 1: The inter-seasonal asset allocation problem. Assets (in staple units) allocated to harvest season consumption are on the x-axis 
and assets allocated to lean season consumption are on the y-axis, e is the endowment. M0 indicates the allocation if there are no 
seasonal frictions and utility functions are identical across seasons. M* is a hypothetical allocation under seasonal frictions. Possible 
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Figure 2: The within-season consumption problem. Assets available for consumption in season t must be allocated across staple food 
(y-axis) and non-food (x-axis). In autarky, the individual chooses (m*t, c*t). Suppose, as a result of the treatment, more assets are 
allocated to season t. The budget line shifts out. Possible post-treatment bundles are                (homothetic utility) or               (staple 
satiation). 
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Figure 3. Timeline of surveys and treatment by year and month
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Table 1: Baseline Summary Statistics and Balance Check
Control Storage-Control Credit-Control
Mean SD Coeff. p-value N Coeff. p-value N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Consumption and Income
Staple consumed, kCal 40.880 25.576 -0.064 0.245 2147 -0.063 0.261 1427
Non-food expenditure 34.242 27.808 0.068 0.299 2145 0.073 0.311 1431
Reported income 76.174 90.806 0.205 0.488 1970 0.270 0.377 1296
Panel B: Seasonal Differences, |Harvest - Lean|
Staple consumed, kCal 24.520 33.102
Monthly non-food expenditure items 10.406 13.709
Reported income 80.726 108.684
Panel C: Food Shortages
1(Anticipate food shortage in January) 0.257 0.437 0.041 0.403 2150 0.095* 0.070 1433
1(Anticipate food shortage in April) 0.276 0.447 0.046 0.377 2150 0.089 0.101 1433
1(Anticipate food shortage in November) 0.102 0.303 0.013 0.619 2150 0.070** 0.047 1433
1(Lacked food last month) 0.590 0.492 -0.027 0.598 2150 0.053 0.339 1433
Panel D: Health
1(Health expenditure shortages) 0.158 0.365 0.008 0.771 2150 0.005 0.856 1433
Number of sick days 0.180 0.557 0.059 0.115 2150 0.022 0.550 1433
Number of sick household members 0.024 0.050 0.004 0.331 2150 0.0004 0.925 1433
Panel E: Agricultural Yields and Storage
Amount of maize produced, kg 145.137 179.054 7.662 0.717 2150 -5.080 0.826 1433
Amount of maize stored, kg 35.045 45.998 -4.542 0.384 2150 -9.709* 0.069 1433
Amount of rice produced, kg 132.165 282.393 -11.229 0.729 2150 -11.219 0.789 1433
Amount of rice stored, kg 27.408 61.887 -3.218 0.578 2150 3.987 0.666 1433
Ratio of maize stored 0.287 0.481 -0.017 0.596 1722 -0.057* 0.057 1145
Ratio of rice stored 0.236 0.416 -0.034 0.399 748 -0.031 0.419 519
Panel F: Household Characteristics
1(Graduated primary school) 0.780 0.415 0.00001 1.000 2150 -0.007 0.826 1433
1(Graduated lower secondary school) 0.241 0.428 0.042 0.181 2150 0.0004 0.990 1433
Age 44.800 12.564 0.445 0.591 2106 0.028 0.977 1403
Number of chickens owned 3.116 3.584 -0.123 0.653 2150 -0.316 0.240 1433
Number of cows owned 0.470 0.988 -0.046 0.521 2150 0.077 0.379 1433
Number of pigs owned 1.269 1.218 -0.178* 0.059 2150 -0.005 0.969 1433
Number of motorcycles owned 0.067 0.251 0.051*** 0.008 2150 0.019 0.259 1433
Household size 4.832 1.830 -0.143 0.314 2150 -0.030 0.854 1433
1(Has savings account in a bank) 0.067 0.251 -0.007 0.612 2150 0.003 0.810 1433
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes–Columns 1 and 2 report means and standard deviations for control villages in the baseline. Columns 3 to 5 report
results from an OLS regression comparing households in storage and control villages in the baseline, controlling for district
fixed effects and clustering standard errors at the village level. Columns 3 and 4 report the coefficient and p-value corre-
sponding to the storage dummy and column 5 reports the sample size for each regression. The full estimation sample for the
storage versus control comparison includes 2150 households. Some dependent variables have missing values. Columns 6 to
8 report results comparing credit and control villages. The full estimation sample for the credit versus control comparison
has 1433 households. In Panel A, we report means and standard deviations of consumption and income in levels (columns
1 and 2) but the regressions reported in columns 3 to 8 are in logs. All expenditure and income values are in thousands of
Rupiahs (1 USD=9000 Rupiahs). All consumption and income variables in Panels A and B, as well as the last two health
outcomes in Panel D, are in per capita per month units.
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Table 2: Impact of Storage and Credit on Outcomes
Treatment: Storage Credit
Season: All Lean Harvest N(All) All Lean Harvest N(All)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Consumption and Income
Consumption and Income Index 0.246** 0.188 0.277** 5907 0.164 0.013 0.267** 6565
(0.112) (0.138) (0.115) (0.107) (0.116) (0.126)
Log(Staple consumed, kCal) 0.014 -0.034 0.039 6009 0.06 -0.067 0.145 6741
(0.066) (0.103) (0.068) (0.086) (0.103) (0.109)
Log(Non-food expenditure) 0.324** 0.311* 0.332** 6042 0.12 -0.015 0.209 6791
(0.135) (0.183) (0.133) (0.124) (0.146) (0.137)
Log(Reported income) 0.515 0.431 0.56 5943 0.543** 0.371 0.662* 6615
(0.339) (0.272) (0.456) (0.249) (0.242) (0.347)
Panel B: Seasonal Differences, |Harvest - Lean|
Seasonal Gap Index -0.027 1834 -0.136 2444
(0.077) (0.085)
Log(Staple consumed, kCal) 0.016 1909 0.003 2593
(0.074) (0.091)
Log(Monthly non-food expenditure items) 0.006 1934 -0.160** 2615
(0.091) (0.079)
Log(Reported income) -0.079 1858 -0.058 2472
(0.146) (0.127)
Panel C: Food Shortages
Food Shortage Index -0.140 -0.306 -0.057 6450 -0.131 -0.014 -0.208 7165
(0.096) (0.195) (0.114) (0.127) (0.169) (0.136)
1(Anticipate food shortage in January) -0.033 -0.139 0.02 6450 -0.097 -0.043 -0.133* 7165
(0.076) (0.140) (0.091) (0.082) (0.112) (0.080)
1(Anticipate food shortage in April) -0.013 -0.063 0.012 6450 -0.022 0.01 -0.043 7165
(0.031) (0.039) (0.032) (0.030) (0.045) (0.039)
1(Anticipate food shortage in November) -0.089* -0.123 -0.073 6450 -0.052 0.056 -0.124* 7165
(0.048) (0.106) (0.062) (0.066) (0.108) (0.074)
1(Lacked food last month) -0.079 -0.177* -0.03 6450 -0.04 -0.08 -0.013 7165
(0.061) (0.099) (0.063) (0.067) (0.075) (0.083)
Panel D: Health
Health Index -0.0002 0.134 -0.067 6450 -0.122 0.188 -0.330*** 7165
(0.074) (0.084) (0.091) (0.103) (0.148) (0.116)
1(Health expenditure shortages last month) 0.005 -0.053 0.034 6450 0.057* -0.015 0.105*** 7165
(0.026) (0.038) (0.027) (0.032) (0.040) (0.037)
Number of sick days 0.033 -0.033 0.066 6450 0.047 -0.160 0.185* 7165
(0.589) (0.047) (0.082) (0.092) (0.140) (0.104)
Number of sick household members -0.004 -0.010 -0.0005 6450 0.006 -0.012 0.018*** 7165
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes–Column 1 reports the results from instrumental variable regressions where the main independent variable is a take-up dummy
instrumented with the storage dummy, with district fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village level. Column 1 pools
all seasons, column 2 only includes lean season surveys and column 3 only includes harvest season surveys. Each pair of cells
reports the coefficient estimate and standard error for the take-up dummy. The full estimation sample has 6450 observations,
including households in storage and control villages from rounds 4 to 6 but the number of observations change for outcomes in
logs, the sample sizes pooling all seasons are reported in column 4. Columns 5 to 8 report results for credit versus control villages.
The full estimation sample has 7165 observations, including households in credit and control villages from rounds 2 to 6. All
expenditure and income values are in thousands of Rupiahs (1 USD=9000 Rupiahs). All consumption and income variables in
Panels A and B, as well as the last two health outcomes in Panel D, are in per capita per month units.
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Table 3: Robustness Checks
Treatment: Storage Credit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Consumption and Income
Consumption and Income Index 0.246** 0.213* 0.198* 0.106** 0.164 0.130 0.113 0.067
(0.112) (0.115) (0.110) (0.046) (0.107) (0.114) (0.111) (0.044)
Log(Staple consumed, kCal) 0.014 0.034 0.027 0.006 0.060 0.082 0.056 0.024
(0.066) (0.066) (0.071) (0.029) (0.086) (0.086) (0.087) (0.036)
Log(Non-food expenditure, in 1000 Rp) 0.324** 0.276** 0.267** 0.139** 0.120 0.070 0.061 0.049
(0.135) (0.116) (0.112) (0.054) (0.124) (0.110) (0.115) (0.050)
Log(Reported income) 0.515 0.487 0.462 0.221 0.543** 0.526** 0.487* 0.221**
(0.339) (0.353) (0.336) (0.144) (0.249) (0.263) (0.266) (0.103)
Panel B: Seasonal Differences, |Harvest - Lean|
Seasonal Gap Index -0.027 -0.012 -0.136 -0.057
(0.077) (0.034) (0.085) (0.035)
Log(Staple consumed, kCal) 0.016 0.007 0.003 0.001
(0.074) (0.033) (0.091) (0.038)
Log(Monthly non-food expenditure items) 0.006 0.003 -0.160** -0.066**
(0.091) (0.040) (0.079) (0.032)
Log(Reported income) -0.079 -0.035 -0.058 -0.024
(0.146) (0.064) (0.127) (0.054)
Panel C: Food Shortages
Food Shortage Index -0.140 -0.138 -0.130 -0.058 -0.131 -0.139 -0.138 -0.052
(0.096) (0.096) (0.093) (0.041) (0.127) (0.126) (0.116) (0.052)
1(Anticipate food shortage in January) -0.033 -0.032 -0.023 -0.014 -0.097 -0.099 -0.101 -0.038
(0.076) (0.076) (0.074) (0.032) (0.082) (0.082) (0.077) (0.034)
1(Anticipate food shortage in April) -0.013 -0.011 -0.012 -0.005 -0.022 -0.023 -0.025 -0.009
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.013) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.012)
1(Anticipate food shortage in November) -0.089* -0.089* -0.087* -0.037* -0.052 -0.052 -0.052 -0.021
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.020) (0.066) (0.066) (0.062) (0.027)
1(Lacked food last month) -0.079 -0.078 -0.075 -0.033 -0.040 -0.043 -0.040 -0.016
(0.061) (0.060) (0.059) (0.026) (0.067) (0.067) (0.065) (0.027)
Panel D: Health
Health Index -0.0002 0.011 0.026 -0.00008 -0.122 -0.119 -0.110 -0.048
(0.074) (0.071) (0.070) (0.031) (0.103) (0.100) (0.098) (0.041)
1(Health expenditure shortages last month) 0.005 0.005 0.010 0.002 0.057* 0.057* 0.064** 0.023*
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.011) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.012)
Number of sick days 0.033 0.022 0.001 0.014 0.047 0.044 0.036 0.019
(0.059) (0.056) (0.056) (0.025) (0.092) (0.090) (0.085) (0.037)
Number of sick household members -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.002 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002)
Estimation IV IV IV OLS IV IV IV OLS
Dependant variable (round 1) No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Demographics (round 1) No No Yes No No No Yes No
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes–Column 1 is the same as column 1 in Table 2 (our main IV estimates for storage). Column 2 controls for baseline values of
the dependent variable. Column 3 adds baseline values of demographics reported in Panel F in Table 1. Each pair of cells reports the
coefficient estimate and standard error for the take-up dummy. Column 4 reports OLS coefficient estimates for the treatment dummy.
Columns 5 to 8 report robustness checks for credit. The full estimation samples for storage are 6450 (columns 1, 2 and 4) and 6318
(column 3) because we dropped some observations with no age information. For credit, the full estimation samples are 7165 (columns
5, 6, and 8) and 7,015 (column 7), when we control for baseline demographics. All expenditure and income values are in thousands of
Rupiahs (1 USD=9000 Rupiahs). All consumption and income variables in Panels A and B, as well as the last two health outcomes in
Panel D, are in per capita per month units.
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Table 4: Other Budget Set Items
Outcome: Gifts Remittances Wage Household size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Storage
1(Take-up) 1.601 -0.308 6.989 -0.137
(4.740) (3.959) (11.117) (0.351)
N 6450 6450 6450 6450
Panel B: Credit
1(Take-up) 1.395 -2.742 -0.241 -0.058
(4.208) (3.128) (8.853) (0.386)
N 7165 7165 7165 7165
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes–This table repeats the IV estimation in column 1 of Table 2 (for
storage, Panel A) and column 5 of Table 2 (for credit, Panel B). Each
column is a regression where the dependent variable is reported in the
column header. The sample sizes for each regression are reported in
the bottom of the panel.The dependent variables for columns 1 to 3 are
the per capita per month transfers, remittances and wages (in thousands
of Rupiahs) reported by the household (including zero’s). In column 4,
household size is the number of household members.
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1 Data
1.1 Describing the sample
In total, we sampled 2,877 households, followed over six survey rounds (odd rounds are lean season
surveys and even rounds are harvest season surveys). Of these households, 720 were in credit
villages, 1,440 were in storage villages (half were in pure and half in contract storage) and 717
were in control villages. There was no attrition. So, in total, we have 17,262 (calculated as 2,877
times 6) observations at the household-by-survey-round level.
We surveyed 30 households out of two hamlets per village in 96 villages. Hamlets within
each village tended to be far apart so our survey team could only focus on surveying households
in 2 hamlets per village. To increase the percent of surveyed households who would be offered
treatment, we first instructed the survey team to select 30 households randomly within 2 hamlets
in both the treatment and control villages. Then, we instructed the facilitators to offer all survey
respondents in each village the option to participate. Since the selection of survey respondents was
independent of the selection of program participants, the respondents in the treatment and control
villages are still comparable, on average.
Our estimation sample includes 2,870 households (713 from control villages, 720 from credit
villages and 1,437 from storage villages). We dropped 7 households because we were not able
to use their ID in the household questionnaire to merge with any of the six rounds of individual
questionnaires. Consequently, we do not have data on the demographics of these households and
the number of household members (which we need to construct per capita variables).
Here are the number of observations for the main estimation samples:
• For the storage versus control villages comparison, the baseline regression (Table 1, column
5) includes 2150 observations (unless there are missing values, discussed below). For credit,
we have 1433 observations (Table 1, column 8).
• The IV estimation for storage that pools all post-treatment surveys (rounds 4 to 6). It is
reported in Table 2 (columns 1 and 4) and has 6450 observations (calculated as 1437 + 713
households times 3 survey rounds). The IV estimation for credit pools rounds 2 to 6. It is
reported in Table 2 (columns 5 and 8) and has 7165 observations (calculated as 720+713
households times 5 survey rounds).
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1.2 Defining key variables
We designed the survey in consultation with researchers from the local agricultural institute, who
conducted the survey. Whenever possible, the survey questions were taken directly from Indone-
sia’s annual household survey, Susenas. We pre-tested the survey questions and made slight modi-
fications to adjust for local crops and staples. In Table A1, we describe how each variable in Table
1 was constructed.
1.3 Data issues
• Outliers: All measures related to income, consumption, production, storage and assets have
been winsorized at the top 2% to minimize biases due to outliers. We also tried winsorizing
at the top 5% and the results are similar.
• Calculating per capita per month values: To calculate per capita values we divided by number
of household members in the contemporaneous survey round. For some household-by-survey
round observations, we filled in the missing values for household size with the mean for that
household (calculated using other survey rounds with non-missing values). To convert weeks
to months, we multipled the total by 4.
• Potential bias due to missing values: As discussed above, the IV estimation sample for the
storage versus control comparison includes 6,450 observations and the estimation sample for
the credit versus control comparison includes 7,165 observations. However, Panels A and
B show that there are missing values because we take logs. Notably, the summary index
(first row in each panel) is only defined if all outcomes used to calculate the index are non-
missing. To check that the censoring due to logs is not driving the results, we also report
results that drop all observations where any of the logged outcomes are missing (about 8%
of the sample). We end up with 5907 observations for storage and 6565 observations for
credit. As shown in Table A2, the results are broadly similar. There is still a zero effect on
staple consumption, and sizeable increases in non-food expenditure for storage and increases
in reported income for credit. The reduction in the seasonal difference in monthly non-food
expenditure items remain for credit so do the health effects, with similar magnitudes.
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2 Other results
2.1 Pure versus absolute seasonal differences
We chose to use absolute differences (|Harvest−Lean|) instead of pure differences ((Harvest−
Lean)) because we are interested in testing whether the treatments reduced the magnitude of the
seasonal gap between harvest and lean seasons for the average household in the treated village.
There are two advantages to using absolute differences. First, we did not want households with
positive pure differences to cancel out households with negative pure differences as we average
across households’ seasonal differences in a village. Taking absolute seasonal gaps would add both
positive and negative seasonal differences.
Second, a significant number of households in our sample have negative pure differences,1 and
for these households, a further reduction in the pure difference (by transferring from the harvest
to the lean season) may not be a welfare improvement. The interpretation depends on whether the
reduction in pure differences comes from preferences or from adverse shocks.
While the absolute difference in consumption across seasons is not independently a measure
of welfare, it can be interpreted in conjunction with overall levels of consumption. In particular,
suppose utility functions are concave, identical and separable across seasons. Then, a reduction of
the absolute seasonal difference can be interpreted as a rise in welfare if total annual consumption
remains the same. In Figure 1, this means that along any inter-seasonal budget constraint with a
slope of -1 (all bundles along this line have the same total consumption levels, i.e. MH +ML is
constant), consumption bundles closer to the 45-degree line are associated with higher indifference
curves. Nevertheless, for completeness, we also report the results using pure differences in Table
A3. None of the coefficients have p-values at or below 5%. The difference for staple consumption
is positive, but only significant at the 10% level.
2.2 Heterogeneous treatment effects
We calculated the baseline retention rate using the total amount or rice and maize in stock in round
3 (lean) divided by the total amount of rice and maize in stock in round 2 (previous harvest). Then,
we created an indicator for households’ whose retention rate is below the median. Since retention
rates are ratios, we had to drop some households that reported zero yield (the denominator) in round
2.
To estimate whether treatment effects differed by retention rates, we repeat Equation (6) but
add two regressors: the indicator for households with below median retention rates and its inter-
action with the take-up dummy (where the interaction is instrumented by the interaction with the
treatment dummy). Incidentally, we cannot construct baseline retention rates for credit households
because we need a harvest and a lean season survey within the same agricultural cycle that is before
treatment (rounds 2 and 3 for storage, but none exist for credit).
Table A4 in the appendix reports IV estimates of these heterogeneous treatment effects. The
column labeled, N(All) reports sample sizes for the regression using all seasons. In the same
column, the p-values in brackets correspond to the test of a zero treatment effect for low gamma
households (we test whether the sum of the coefficients on the take-up dummy and the interaction
1In our control group, close to half of the households have larger staple consumption or non-food expenditures in
the lean season than the harvest season (so, the pure difference of harvest minus lean is negative).
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term is zero, using the estimation sample that pools both seasons). The results show that most of the
effects reported in Table 2 on consumption appear to be concentrated amongst households with low
baseline retention rates (it is the coefficient on the interaction term that is positive and statistically
significant). This is in line with our theory that the storage treatment expanded the budget set, with
a more significant improvement for households with low baseline retention rates.
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Table A1: Variable Construction


























  1(Anticipate food shortages in January) 1(Response = No) Do you think you can afford to buy food for the following January? Household
  1(Anticipate food shortages in April) 1(Response = No) Do you think you can afford to buy food for the following April? Household
  1(Anticipate food shortages in November) 1(Response = No) Do you think you can afford to buy food for the following November? Household
  1(Lacked food last month) 1(Response = Yes) Have you lacked food in the last month? Household
Panel D: Health











  Amount of maize produced, kg Total maize produced. In the previous harvest season how much of maize did you produce (in kg)? Household
  Amount of maize stored, kg Total maize in storage. In the past 3 months, what is the amount of maize in storage now (in kg)? Household
  Amount of rice produced, kg Total rice produced. In the previous harvest season, how much of rice did you produce (in kg)? Household
  Amount of rice stored, kg Total rice in storage. in the past 3 months, what is the amount of rice in storage now (in kg)? Household
  Ratio of rice stored Total rice in storage/total rice produced Amount of rice stored, divided by amount of rice produced (in kg) Household
  Ratio of maize stored Total maize in storage/total maize produced Amount of maize stored, divided by amount of maize produced (in kg) Household
Panel F: Household Characteristics
  1(Graduated primary school) 1(Household head completed primary school or more) What is the highest education achieved? (Response: 02 Primary education) Individual
  1(Graduated lower secondar school) 1(Household head completed lower secondary school or more) What is the highest education achieved? (Response: 03 Lower secondary education) Individual
  Age of household head Year of survey ‐ year of birth What is the year of birth? Individual
  Number of chickens owned Number of chickens owned How of chickens do you own? Household
  Number of cows owned Number of cows owned How of cows do you own? Household
  Number of pig owned Number of pig owned How of pigs do you own? Household




Table A2: Missing outcomes
Treatment: Storage Credit
Season: All Lean Harvest N(All) All Lean Harvest N(All)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Consumption and Income
Consumption and Income Index 0.246** 0.188 0.277** 5907 0.164 0.013 0.267** 6565
(0.112) (0.138) (0.115) (0.107) (0.116) (0.126)
Log(Staple consumed, kCal) 0.017 -0.04 0.045 5907 0.044 -0.068 0.12 6565
(0.066) (0.101) (0.069) (0.082) (0.102) (0.103)
Log(Non-food expenditure, in 1000 Rp) 0.337** 0.312* 0.352*** 5907 0.12 -0.014 0.209 6565
(0.132) (0.177) (0.131) (0.119) (0.141) (0.133)
Log(Reported income) 0.514 0.427 0.56 5907 0.536** 0.379 0.646* 6565
(0.338) (0.269) (0.455) (0.247) (0.239) (0.344)
Panel B: Seasonal Differences, |Harvest - Lean|
Seasonal Gap Index -0.027 1834 -0.136 2444
(0.077) (0.085)
Log(Staple consumed, kCal) 0.013 1834 -0.014 2444
(0.075) (0.090)
Log(Monthly non-food expenditure items) -0.003 1834 -0.156** 2444
(0.091) (0.078)
Log(Reported income) -0.085 1834 -0.072 2444
(0.141) (0.124)
Panel C: Food Shortages
Food Shortage Index -0.122 -0.291 -0.04 5907 -0.139 -0.022 -0.217 6565
(0.096) (0.200) (0.113) (0.132) (0.176) (0.138)
1(Anticipate food shortage in January) -0.018 -0.13 0.037 5907 -0.089 -0.046 -0.118 6565
(0.077) (0.146) (0.092) (0.085) (0.117) (0.083)
1(Anticipate food shortage in April) -0.012 -0.065 0.015 5907 -0.03 0 -0.051 6565
(0.032) (0.040) (0.032) (0.029) (0.044) (0.036)
1(Anticipate food shortage in November) -0.080* -0.108 -0.067 5907 -0.056 0.052 -0.128* 6565
(0.048) (0.106) (0.062) (0.069) (0.111) (0.076)
1(Lacked food last month) -0.078 -0.180* -0.028 5907 -0.05 -0.076 -0.032 6565
(0.063) (0.105) (0.063) (0.070) (0.078) (0.084)
Panel D: Health
Health Index -0.016 0.13 -0.089 5907 -0.127 0.176 -0.331*** 6565
(0.072) (0.087) (0.088) (0.103) (0.150) (0.116)
1(Health expenditure shortages last month) 0.005 -0.054 0.035 5907 0.055* -0.01 0.100*** 6565
(0.026) (0.040) (0.027) (0.032) (0.041) (0.038)
Number of sick days 0.046 -0.032 0.087 5907 0.055 -0.154 0.196* 6565
(0.056) (0.049) (0.077) (0.092) (0.143) (0.104)
Number of sick household members -0.003 -0.009 0.001 5907 0.007 -0.011 0.018*** 6565
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes–This table replicates Table 2, but drops all observations with missing values.
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Table A3: Actual differences
Treatment: Storage Credit
(1) (2)
Seasonal Gap Index 0.010 0.047
(0.188) (0.141)
log(Staple consumed, kCal) 0.252* 0.256
(0.147) (0.158)
log(Monthly non-food expenditure items) 0.047 -0.043
(0.223) (0.190)
log(Reported income) -0.414 -0.087
(0.358) (0.225)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes–This table repeats the regressions in Panel B of Table
2, except using actual differences instead of absolute differ-
ences. For the seasonal gap index, the estimation sample for
storage includes 1834 observations and the estimation sample
for credit includes 2444 observations.
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Table A4: IV for Storage Treatment, by Baseline Retention Rate
Season: N(All) All Lean Harvest
[p-value] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Consumption and Income
Consumption and Income Index 5494 0.088 (0.113) 0.070 (0.127) 0.098 (0.119)
Consumption and Income Index_LG [0.00] 0.344*** (0.127) 0.276* (0.148) 0.379*** (0.136)
Log(Staple consumed, kCal) 5583 -0.056 (0.069) -0.099 (0.104) -0.035 (0.078)
Log(Staple consumed, kCal)_LG [0.20] 0.163* (0.083) 0.178 (0.113) 0.156* (0.094)
Log(Non-food expenditure, in 1000 Rp) 5603 0.151 (0.135) 0.139 (0.165) 0.158 (0.139)
Log(Non-food expenditure, in 1000 Rp)_LG [0.00] 0.321** (0.148) 0.349** (0.163) 0.306* (0.159)
Log(Reported income) 5515 0.259 (0.265) 0.327 (0.268) 0.229 (0.344)
Log(Reported income)_LG [0.06] 0.613* (0.313) 0.251 (0.308) 0.795** (0.392)
Panel B: Seasonal Differences, |Harvest - Lean|
Seasonal Gap Index 1721 0.037 (0.086)
Seasonal Gap Index_LG [0.25] -0.148 (0.107)
Log(Staple consumed, kCal) 1788 0.067 (0.070)
Log(Staple consumed, kCal)_LG [0.90] -0.080 (0.090)
Log(Monthly non-food expenditure items) 1801 0.001 (0.091)
Log(Monthly non-food expenditure items)_LG [0.97] 0.003 (0.112)
Log(Reported income) 1735 0.003 (0.146)
Log(Reported income)_LG [0.22] -0.246 (0.202)
Panel C: Food Shortages
Food Shortage Index 5916 -0.083 (0.090) -0.197 (0.181) -0.026 (0.107)
Food Shortage Index_LG [0.11] -0.122 (0.113) -0.206 (0.166) -0.080 (0.151)
1(Anticipate food shortage in January) 5916 -0.023 (0.066) -0.105 (0.127) 0.019 (0.082)
1(Anticipate food shortage in January)_LG [0.67] -0.021 (0.085) -0.048 (0.120) -0.008 (0.107)
1(Anticipate food shortage in April) 5916 -0.018 (0.030) -0.052 (0.040) -0.002 (0.033)
1(Anticipate food shortage in April)_LG [0.76] 0.006 (0.042) -0.029 (0.062) 0.023 (0.041)
1(Anticipate food shortage in November) 5916 -0.021 (0.043) -0.020 (0.100) -0.021 (0.056)
1(Anticipate food shortage in November)_LG [0.02] -0.135** (0.065) -0.193** (0.090) -0.105 (0.095)
1(Lacked food last month) 5916 -0.084 (0.067) -0.180* (0.094) -0.036 (0.074)
1(Lacked food last month)_LG [0.18] -0.004 (0.063) -0.006 (0.105) -0.003 (0.067)
Panel D: Health
Health Index 5916 0.041 (0.078) 0.225** (0.094) -0.050 (0.097)
Health Index_LG [0.58] -0.095 (0.108) -0.198** (0.096) -0.044 (0.144)
1(Health expenditure shortages last month) 5916 -0.007 (0.030) -0.048 (0.047) 0.014 (0.032)
1(Health expenditure shortages last month)_LG [0.37] 0.031 (0.030) -0.009 (0.049) 0.051 (0.039)
Number of sick days 5916 0.019 (0.059) -0.088* (0.050) 0.073 (0.080)
Number of sick days_LG [0.73] 0.012 (0.105) 0.098 (0.060) -0.031 (0.148)
Number of sick household members 5916 -0.007 (0.006) -0.019** (0.007) -0.001 (0.007)
Number of sick household members_LG [0.70] 0.009 (0.007) 0.022*** (0.007) 0.002 (0.009)
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes–This table reports heterogeneous treatment effect regressions by the baseline retention rate of each household. Each
regression corresponds to an instrumental variable regression where the two main independent variables are (i) a take-up dummy
instrumented with the treatment assignment (ii) the take-up dummy interacted with a dummy for below median retention rate.
Each group of four cells above reports the coefficient estimate and standard error for these two independent variables in a
regression. The dependent variable for each regression is noted in the table. All regressions include district (kabupaten) fixed
effects because assignment of treatment was within each district. Standard errors reported in the parentheses. All standard errors
are clustered at the village level. Columns 1-2 use all the post treatment data (rounds 4 to 6). Columns 3-4 only include lean
season data (round 5). Columns 5-6 only include harvest season data (rounds 4 and 6). N(All) reports the sample size for the
regression using all seasons (columns 1 and 2). P-values (in brackets) correspond to a test that the sum of the take-up dummy
and the interaction is equal to zero, for the regression with all seasons.
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Table A5: IV for Storage Treatment for Alfa Omega and TLM Districts
NGO: Alfa Omega Districts TLM Districts
Season: All Lean Harvest All Lean Harvest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Consumption and Income
Consumption and Income Index 0.201** 0.173 0.216*** 0.307 0.209 0.359
(0.103) (0.170) (0.083) (0.223) (0.227) (0.244)
Log(Staple consumed, kCal) 0.045 -0.026 0.079 -0.028 -0.044 -0.016
(0.069) (0.113) (0.068) (0.127) (0.189) (0.135)
Log(Non-food expenditure, in 1000 Rp) 0.285** 0.309 0.275** 0.378 0.313 0.410
(0.142) (0.236) (0.129) (0.255) (0.289) (0.262)
Log(Reported income) 0.214 0.294 0.175 0.923 0.615 1.085
(0.216) (0.333) (0.210) (0.729) (0.444) (1.027)
Panel B: Seasonal Differences, |Harvest - Lean|
Seasonal Gap Index -0.035 -0.017
(0.110) (0.104)
Log(Staple consumed, kCal) -0.049 0.105
(0.077) (0.138)
Log(Monthly non-food expenditure items) 0.086 -0.103
(0.138) (0.110)
Log(Reported income) -0.105 -0.046
(0.134) (0.287)
Panel C: Food Shortages
Food Shortage Index -0.134 -0.360 -0.021 -0.147 -0.230 -0.105
(0.102) (0.284) (0.110) (0.181) (0.246) (0.226)
1(Anticipate food shortage in January) 0.007 -0.214 0.117 -0.088 -0.036 -0.114
(0.088) (0.199) (0.108) (0.135) (0.190) (0.155)
1(Anticipate food shortage in April) -0.033 -0.070 -0.015 0.016 -0.052 0.050
(0.042) (0.051) (0.041) (0.045) (0.059) (0.047)
1(Anticipate food shortage in November) -0.057 -0.108 -0.031 -0.134 -0.143 -0.129
(0.051) (0.160) (0.059) (0.089) (0.120) (0.123)
1(Lacked food last month) -0.143* -0.216 -0.107 0.009 -0.124 0.076
(0.077) (0.133) (0.070) (0.096) (0.148) (0.110)
Panel D: Health
Health Index -0.116 0.107 -0.228* 0.159 0.172 0.153
(0.107) (0.121) (0.131) (0.100) (0.112) (0.123)
1(Health expenditure shortages last month) 0.032 -0.045 0.070** -0.032 -0.064 -0.016
(0.035) (0.057) (0.034) (0.039) (0.044) (0.044)
Number of sick days 0.098 -0.054 0.174 -0.057 -0.006 -0.082
(0.089) (0.060) (0.125) (0.069) (0.073) (0.092)
Number of sick household members 0.004 -0.005 0.009 -0.014* -0.017 -0.013
(0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009)
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes–This table repeats IV regressions for storage reported in columns 1 to 3 in Table 2, but does so
separately for Alfa Omega villages (columns 1 to 3 in this table) and TLM villages (columns 4 to 6 in this
table).
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Table A6: IV for Credit Treatment for Alfa Omega and TLM Districts
NGO: Alfa Omega Districts TLM Districts
Season: All Lean Harvest All Lean Harvest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Consumption and Income
Consumption and Income Index 0.153* 0.016 0.246** 0.181 0.008 0.298
(0.090) (0.118) (0.101) (0.230) (0.228) (0.280)
Log(Staple consumed, kCal) 0.057 -0.044 0.125 0.064 -0.100 0.176
(0.075) (0.088) (0.092) (0.182) (0.220) (0.237)
Log(Non-food expenditure, in 1000 Rp) 0.129 -0.003 0.218 0.106 -0.032 0.195
(0.128) (0.157) (0.147) (0.241) (0.277) (0.262)
Log(Reported income) 0.390** 0.287 0.459*** 0.772 0.497 0.966
(0.152) (0.239) (0.150) (0.581) (0.485) (0.840)
Panel B: Seasonal Differences, |Harvest - Lean|
Seasonal Gap Index -0.169** -0.087
(0.085) (0.169)
Log(Staple consumed, kCal) -0.024 0.043
(0.060) (0.206)
Log(Monthly non-food expenditure items) -0.135 -0.198
(0.093) (0.139)
Log(Reported income) -0.175 0.120
(0.131) (0.249)
Panel C: Food Shortages
Food Shortage Index -0.259* -0.159 -0.326** 0.058 0.198 -0.036
(0.135) (0.196) (0.142) (0.246) (0.301) (0.267)
1(Anticipate food shortage in January) -0.109 -0.111 -0.107 -0.080 0.057 -0.171
(0.098) (0.139) (0.092) (0.143) (0.190) (0.143)
1(Anticipate food shortage in April) -0.065** -0.020 -0.096** 0.042 0.052 0.035
(0.033) (0.048) (0.037) (0.055) (0.085) (0.075)
1(Anticipate food shortage in November) -0.113 -0.040 -0.163** 0.038 0.196 -0.067
(0.072) (0.132) (0.081) (0.127) (0.179) (0.141)
1(Lacked food last month) -0.132* -0.101 -0.152 0.096 -0.048 0.191
(0.078) (0.087) (0.095) (0.124) (0.133) (0.155)
Panel D: Health
Health Index -0.112 0.243 -0.349** -0.137 0.108 -0.301
(0.125) (0.187) (0.144) (0.176) (0.242) (0.191)
1(Health expenditure shortages last month) 0.044 -0.002 0.074* 0.077 -0.035 0.151**
(0.034) (0.039) (0.042) (0.060) (0.080) (0.068)
Number of sick days 0.069 -0.235 0.272** 0.015 -0.049 0.057
(0.122) (0.194) (0.137) (0.136) (0.203) (0.150)
Number of sick household members 0.005 -0.015 0.018** 0.009 -0.007 0.019*
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012)
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes–This table repeats IV regressions for credit reported in columns 5 to 7 in Table 2, but does so separately
for Alfa Omega villages (columns 1 to 3 in this table) and TLM villages (columns 4 to 6 in this table).
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